SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we
hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the
more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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CONDOMINIUMS-STANDING

TO SUE-OWNER'S

ASSOCIATION

HAS

EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO SUE FOR DEFECTS IN COMMON ELEMENTS-

Siller v. Hartz Mountain Assocs., 93 N.J. 370, 461 A.2d 568
(1983).
Harmon Cove is a condominium community in Secaucus developed by Hartz Mountain Associates (Developer). Under New Jersey's
Condominium Act, each unit is a separate parcel of real estate owned
in fee simple. Additionally, each owner enjoys an individual interest
as tenant in common in the "common elements," such as the grounds
and facilities used by, and accessible to all unit owners. 93 N.J. at 375,
461 A.2d at 570. Management, maintenance, and repair of the common elements are entrusted to an association run by a board of
directors. Initially the board is controlled by the developer, but as the
percentage of unsold units decreases, the unit owners' representation
on the board increases until all the units are sold and the board is
comprised entirely of unit owners. Id. at 376, 461 A.2d at 571. In
January, 1978 Harmon Cove Association (Association) empanelled a
Legal Action Committee (Committee) to investigate charges that the
Developer was responsible for substantial and varied construction
defects in the residential buildings and the common elements. In June,
1978 the Committee reported that it found the units noisy, leaking,
improperly heated, improperly air conditioned, and poorly insulated,
and that the development as a whole suffered from inadequate parking, landscaping, and recreational facilities. The Committee recommended that an attorney be retained to bring suit against the Developer. The Association at first adopted the recommendation, but later
dismissed the attorney and negotiated a settlement through its general
counsel. The settlement called for payment of $400,000 to the Association by the Developer in exchange for a general release. Id. at 383,
461 A.2d at 575.
Five unit owners, unhappy with the terms of the settlement,
brought suit individually and on behalf of others similarly situated in
the chancery division. Four of the five counts charged the Developer
with liability for the numerous defects and deficiencies found by the
Committee. The remaining count was against the Association. It
alleged the facts of the pending settlement and claimed, essentially,
that the Association had breached its fiduciary duty to plaintiffs by
negotiating an inadequate, unreasonable settlement. The trial court
considered the initial issue to be one of standing. While the trial court
dismissed the four counts against the Developer, holding that the
Association alone had standing to enforce these rights, it sustained the
one count against the Association. Plaintiffs appealed to the appellate
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division which affirmed the trial court decision. Plaintiffs' petition for
certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court was granted. Id. at
373-74, 461 A.2d at 569-70.
The supreme court affirmed in part and reversed in part. In an
opinion by Justice Schreiber, the court held that, except in four circumstances, the Association has the exclusive right to remedy defects
to the common elements. Justice Schreiber began by noting that while
condominiums were an ancient concept, the rights and duties associated with this unique form of ownership are created by modern
statute. He observed that while an individual may own his own
apartment, under the statutory scheme of the Condominium Act, the
common elements are specifically charged to the Association, which
has the power to contract, to sue and be sued, to obtain insurance,
and to assess maintenance fees to common owners. Moreover, while
the Association retains a right of entry to each unit for repairs of
common elements, the unit owner is precluded under penalty of
injunction from any unauthorized action affecting these areas. The
court concluded that a sensible reading of the statute mandates that
the Association have exclusive standing to maintain actions relating to
common elements. Id. at 375-81 & n.4, 461 A.2d at 570-73 & n.4.
The court specified, however, four situations where the individual owners have a right to sue. First, where an association fails to act
on a claim involving common elements, the individual owner may
bring suit against the developer. The court observed that since such
actions are derivative in nature, the association must also be named as
a party. Second, an individual may sue the developer when the association is still under the developer's control. The court reasoned that this
protects first buyers who purchase without the benefit of an independent association. Third, the court held that with the right to exclusive
management comes a fiduciary duty to the individual owners. Breach
of that duty, as was properly alleged by plaintiffs, opens the association to suit by individual owners. Finally, the court recognized that
where the harm is direct and not derivative, the individual owner
may sue the developer. In the instant case, Justice Schreiber noted
that the trial court had failed to recognize that the alleged facts
included damage involving not only the common elements, but also
the individual units. He commented that where the harm alleged was
to the individual's estate in fee, direct suit is an appropriate action.
The supreme court, therefore, while affirming the statutory interpretation of the trial court, remanded the case for an itemizing of the
individual claims based on direct harm. Id. at 381-82, 384, 461 A.2d
at 574-75.
The court's analogy to the law of corporations is a good one.
While the statutory scheme of centralized control precipitates the
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efficient management of common assets, a policy that benefits all, the
power must not be exercised to the detriment of the fragmented, less
powerful majority. Where the association is independent and exercises
its statutory duty mindful of its relationship to its members, its power
should be plenary. Where the converse is true, or the harm is direct,
the individual owner is properly allowed to independently protect his
rights. Thus, the court strikes a proper balance between promoting
the legislative scheme and protecting the interests of the individually
aggrieved.
Noel Lawrence Hillman

CRIMINAL
NATION

LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-SUPREME COURT DETERMITHAT THE RANDOM

ENFORCEMENT

OFFICERS IS

STOPPING OF AUTOMOBILES
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT-State

SHOULD

BY LAW
NOT BE

v. Gervasio, 94 N.J. 23, 462

A.2d 144 (1983).
On September 25, 1978 a car driven by Ralph Gervasio and
occupied by Dana Ann Michie was stopped on the New Jersey Turnpike by State Police. The routine stop was made in order to check
compliance with driver's license and vehicle registration laws. In the
course of checking Gervasio's license and registration, one of the
troopers detected the smell of marijuana emanating from the car. The
driver was informed that the officers suspected that contraband was
contained within the car and accordingly, it would be necessary to
take the car to the police station and obtain a search warrant unless
voluntary consent was given for an immediate search. Gervasio allowed the officers to look in the car's trunk where five bales of
marijuana were found. Both the driver and passenger were subsequently indicted on drug charges. 94 N.J. at 25 & n.1, 462 A.2d at
145-46 & n.1.
Defendants filed a motion with the trial court to suppress the
evidence seized as a consequence of the stop. The motion was based on
a retroactive application of a United States Supreme Court holding in
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), in which the Court held
that the random stopping of vehicles on public roads was unconstitutional. 94 N.J. at 24, 462 A.2d at 145. The trial court heard the
defendants' motion, but reserved judgment pending a decision by the
New Jersey Supreme Court on the retroactivity of Prouse. After the
state supreme court determined that Prouse should apply only prospectively to random stops which occurred after March 27, 1979, the
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trial court upheld the constitutionality of the stop of defendants' car.
Id. at 25, 462 A.2d at 146. Defendants pled guilty to drug possession
charges but appealed the denial of their suppression motion. The
appellate division affirmed and the New Jersey Supreme Court
granted certification. Id. at 26, 462 A.2d at 146.
The supreme court affirmed, reasoning that pursuant to guidelines enunciated in United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), the
Prouse decision could not be applied retroactively because it represented a clear break with past constitutional decisions involving the
routine stop of automobiles. 94 N.J. at 32, 462 A.2d at 150. Justice
Handler, writing for the majority, noted that Johnson indicated a
clear break with the past has occurred if a ruling expressly overrules a
prior United States Supreme Court holding, disapproves of a practice
which has been arguably sanctioned by the Supreme Court in prior
cases, or overturns a longstanding, widespread practice about which
the Supreme Court has not spoken, but about which a nearly unanimous number of lower courts have expressly approved. Id. at 26, 462
A.2d at 146. Justice Handler reasoned that two of the three criteria set
forth in Johnson had been met in Prouse. He observed that the random stopping of vehicles to check for license and registration arguably
had been sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Brigroni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), a pre-Prouse decision
concerning random stops by border patrols. Id. at 28, 462 A.2d at
147. Justice Handler additionally noted that Prouse overturned a
widespread practice in a majority of jurisdictions, including New
Jersey. Id. at 30-31, 462 A.2d at 148-49. He concluded that since
Prouse met two of Johnson's criteria, the decision represented a clear
break with the past and could not be given retroactive application. Id.
at 27-28, 462 A.2d at 147.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice O'Hern also utilized the threeprong analysis set forth in Johnson. He concluded, however, that
Prouse did not clearly fit within any of the three categories which
would indicate that the decision constituted a clear break with past
authority. Id. at 42, 462 A.2d at 155 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). He
therefore reasoned that Prouse should be applied retroactively, even if
there was an element of unfairness in affording defendants such an
application. Id. at 45, 462 A.2d at 157 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
This decision was based on public policy objectives which favored the good faith reliance of law enforcement officers on the state
law which existed at the time of their actions. In holding as it did, the
court avoided the administrative problems and the detrimental effects
to the administration of justice which would have resulted if Prouse
had been given retroactive effect. Nevertheless, even a prospective
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application of Prouse will probably operate to exclude important
evidence seized by law enforcement officials.
Marianne M. De Marco

TORTS-PUBLIC EMPLOYEES-DISMISSAL OF CLAIM AGAINST PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE NOT REQUIRED WHEN

FINAL JUDGMENT ENTERED IN

FAVOR OF PUBLIC ENTITY FOR CLAIMANT'S FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF TORT CLAIMS ACT-Williams v.
Adams, 189 N.J. Super. 196, 459 A.2d 707 (Law Div. 1983).

On April 22, 1980, plaintiff was involved in a car accident with a
vehicle owned by Atlantic County and operated by the defendant,
Mr. Silvern, a county employee. Plaintiff filed a claim against the
county and Silvern on April 20, 1982 for injuries sustained in the
accident. It is, however, a statutory prerequisite under the Torts
Claim Act that one bringing suit against a public entity file a notice of
claim with said entity within 90 days of accrual action. As plaintiff
never filed a notice of claim with Atlantic County, the county's motion for dismissal was granted. 189 N.J. Super. at 197, 459 A.2d at
707-08. The county moved to have the dismissal certified as a final
judgment, and the court agreed to do so primarily on the ground that
the failure to file a timely notice of claim forever barred plaintiff from
bringing a claim against the county. Id. at 197-98, 459 A.2d at 708.
The county then moved for a dismissal of the action against Silvern,
relying on N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-6(a) (West 1982), which provides as
follows:
Where a claimant has
for a claim arising out
entity, a judgment or
against the employee
matter.

pursued his remedy against a public entity
of the act or omission of a public employee
settlement shall be a complete bar to suit
in a claim arising from the same subject

Id., 189 N.J. Super. at 197-98, 459 A.2d at 708. The county argued
that a "judgment" as intended by this section includes a final judgment dismissing a claim against a public entity for plaintiff's failure to
file a notice of claim as required by the Tort Claims Act.
The law division disagreed with the county's argument and held
that under these circumstances, a dismissal of claim against a public
employee is not mandated by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-6(a). Judge
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Perskie emphasized that a decision not to sue a public entity does not
bar suit against the employee, and he noted that the notice of claim
requirement applies only to public entities and not their employees.
189 N.J. Super at 198, 459 A.2d at 708. Judge Perskie recognized N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 59:9-6(a) as a codification of the principles of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, neither of which applied in the absence of a substantive determination of the claim. Id. at 199, 459 A.2d
at 708-09. The court found support for this construction within the
fabric of the Torts Claims Act, a basic purpose of which was to
reestablish sovereign immunity with certain exceptions. Id. at 199200, 459 A.2d at 709. Judge Perskie considered sovereign immunity a
jurisdictional bar to suit, and reasoned that the notice of claim requirement removes this bar and is thereby a condition of a plaintiff's
"right of action, not his remedy." Id. Judge Perskie therefore concluded that just because plaintiff, by failing to file a notice of claim, is
precluded from bringing an action, it cannot be held that she has
pursued her remedy as contemplated by the statute. Id. at 200, 459
A.2d at 709.
The court found additional support for its construction of N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 59:9-6(a) by comparing it to the analagous provision of
the California Torts Claims Act, the model for the New Jersey enactment. The California Act disallows claims against public employees if
an action against the public entity is barred for any reason. The bar
extends not only to situations where there was a failure to file a timely
notice of claim, but also to situations where no claim was filed against
the public entity. Judge Perskie reasoned that if the New Jersey Legislature had intended to follow the California lead in this regard, it
would have employed the broader language used by the California
Legislature rather than making a judgment or settlement a prerequisite to a bar to suit. Id.
The court's decision is based on a well-reasoned interpretation of
the relevant statutes. The case is significant for its identification of the
conflict contained within the Tort Claims Act, since the ruling does
nullify the strict notice of claim requirement with respect to those
public entities which have adopted a policy of indemnification. The
ultimate effect is to deprive those entities of the protection of sovereign
immunity, contrary to the stated purpose of the act. The Williams
decision is likely to have the consequence of discouraging indemnification of employees by public entities where such indemnification is not
required by law.
Joel L. Botwick
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STATUTORY CHALLENGES TO LOCAL ELECTIONS-VIO-

LATIONS OF STATUTORY

REQUIREMENTS

LOTS TO INVALIDATION-In

SUBJECTS ABSENTEE

BAL-

re Battle, 190 N.J. Super. 232, 462

A.2d 1291 (App. Div. 1983).
In the November, 1982 election for a seat on the Township
Committee of Neptune Township, Joseph Pepe defeated Almerth Battle by 24 votes. Of the 9,961 votes cast, 342 were by absentee ballot.
190 N.J. at 233, 462 A.2d at 1292. A New Jersey statute provides that
the voter shall not release his absentee ballot to a messenger "unless
the ballot is sealed in the outer envelope and the person who shall
transport . . . it first signs and prints his name on the outer envelope."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:57-37.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984). State
law also requires the messenger who delivers the absentee ballot to
"sign a record which the county shall maintain of all absentee ballots
personally delivered to it." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:57-23 (West Cum.
Supp. 1983-1984). Battle challenged the validity of 74 absentee ballots
which came from voters residing in nursing homes. 190 N.J. at 23334, 242, 462 A.2d at 1292, 1297. She claimed that since the questioned
votes did not comport with the statutory requirements pertaining to
the delivery of absentee ballots, they were void and uncountable. Id.
at 233-34, 462 A.2d at 1292.
At a hearing to determine the validity of Battle's claims, Pepe
made a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 234, 462 A.2d at 1292.
Pepe argued that the statutory requirements were directory and a
violation of them could not operate to disenfranchise a voter. Id. The
trial court granted Pepe's request, concluding that the purpose of the
provisions was to protect the voter and that the purpose of the provisions was to protect the voter and that only a showing that the ballots
had been tampered with could disqualify them. Id. at 234-35, 462
A.2d at 1292-93.
The appellate division vacated the entry of summary judgment.
Id. at 244, 462 A.2d at 1298. Judge McElroy, writing for the court,
disagreed with the trial judge's conclusion that the applicable statutes
were merely directory. Id. at 235, 462 A.2d at 1293. He held that the
requirements of the provisions were mandatory, and that any nonconforming absentee ballots were subject to invalidation. Id. at 242, 462
A.2d at 1297-98. In reaching this decision, the court noted that the
provisions in issue were enacted as a result of an election law reform
aimed at protection the absentee voting process from fraud. Id. at
235-41, 462 A.2d at 1293-97. Judge McElroy observed that the imper-
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ative language the legislature used in drafting the provisions placed
the burden of complying with the requirements on both the voter and
the messenger. Id. at 241-43, 462 A.2d at 1297-98. He commented
that when, as in the present case, these requirements are ignored and
the votes are nevertheless counted, the effectiveness of the statute is
diluted. While noting that disenfranchisement of a voter is a drastic
remedy, the court reasoned that this result was necessary in order to
effectuate the legislative goals. Id. at 243, 462 A.2d at 1298. Judge
McElroy remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine the legality of the votes in question. Id. at 244, 462 A.2d at 1299.
In Battle, the court determined that prevention of fraud in the
absentee voting process was a paramount concern of the legislature in
enacting absentee voting legislation. This purpose can only be effectuated, according to the court, if the statutory delivery requirements are
strictly complied with. Such a holding provides guidelines for future
courts in settling election challenges.
Nancy A. Zajac

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-STATE BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION'S

DENIAL OF LICENSE TO AWARD COLLEGE DEGREE TO RELIGIOUS

SCHOOL

Is

NOT VIOLATIVE OF FIRST AMENDMENT-New

Jersey

State Bd. v. Board of Directors, 90 N.J. 470, 448 A.2d 988 (1982).
Shelton College is operated by the Bible Presbyterian Church. All
academic subjects are taught from a Christian fundamentalist perspective. 90 N.J. at 473-74, 448 A.2d at 989-90. In 1965, the New
Jersey Board of Higher Education (the Board) proposed to terminate
Shelton College's power to confer baccalaureate degrees because certain minimum requirements had not been met. Shelton College challenged the constitutionality of N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A: 68-3,-6 (West
1968), and the provisions which regulate the granting of baccalaureate degrees. 90 N.J. at 474, 48 A.2d at 990. In 1971, the Board
revoked Shelton college's license to award degrees in New Jersey. Id.
at 475, 448 A.2d at 990.
In February 1979, Shelton College submitted a new application
for authorization to award baccalaureate degrees in certain fields of
study. Before receiving authorization, the college began offering degree track courses. On November 15, 1979, the Board brought suit in

chancery division alleging that N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§§ 68-3,-6, which
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allows only Board licensed institutions to confer degrees, were violated by Shelton College's operations in New Jersey. On November 19,
Shelton College and various students and faculty members brought an
action in United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The federal plaintiffs alleged
that their first, ninth, and fourteenth amendment rights were violated
by the application of New Jersey licensing statutes to Shelton College's
educational operations. Id. at 475-76, 448 A.2d at 991.
The district court issued a preliminary injunction that enjoined
the state from taking any action to prevent Shelton College from
engaging in its educational activities, but refrained from ruling on the
licensing statute's applicability to religious institutions in order to
permit New Jersey courts to resolve the issue. Id. at 476, 448 A.2d at
991. The Board appealed the district court's order, and the federal
plaintiffs cross-appealed. Meanwhile, the chancery court upheld the
constitutionality of the licensing statutes as applied to Shelton College
and entered a permanent injunction that restrained the college from
awarding degrees or course credits in New Jersey without a license.
On April 14, 1981, the Third Circuit upheld the district court's order
that granted injunctive relief. In addition, the Third Circuit approved
the district court's decision to stay further federal proceedings until
state court action was completed. Id. On May 18, 1981, the district
court entered a revised preliminary injunction that prevented enforcement of the superior court's order until the Supreme Court of New
Jersey addressed the validity of the statute in question. Id. at 476-77,
448 A.2d at 991.
The New Jersey Supreme Court modified and affirmed that judgment of the chancery court. Id. at 490-91, 448 A.2d at 990-91. The
court held that application of N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:68-3,-6 to
sectarian institutions does not unduly interfere with the first amendment right to the free exercise of religion, nor does it create an
excessive state entanglement with religion. Id. at 487, 448 A.2d at
998. In reaching this determination, Justice O'Hern, writing for the
court, first noted that the legislature intended the statutes to apply to
all institutions, including those with religious affiliations. Id. at 47781, 448 A.2d at 991-93. Justice O'Hern then observed that to determine if the state's licensing process unconstitutionally infringes upon
the free exercise of defendant's religion, the court must decide if the
state's interest in regulating academic degrees constitutionally justifies
the burden that it would impose on defendants' rights. Id. at 481, 448
A.2d at 993. Justice O'Hern argued that the legislation at issue was
intended to advance the state's substantial interest in maintaining the
integrity of the baccalaureate degree and in ensuring minimum edu-
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cational standards. Id. at 484, 448 A.2d at 995. He reasoned that
although the defendants' exercise of religion may suffer some indirect
burden from applications of the statutes, the constitutional balance
nonetheless favors the state's substantial interest since accommodation
of defendants' beliefs would erode respect for the educational system,
undermine the integrity of the baccalaureate degree, and encourage
other institutions to seek exemptions from licensing requirements. Id.
at 487, 448 A.2d at 996. Justice O'Hern further remarked that the
states' licensing requirements did not require extensiv_ state entanglement with religion in violation of the establishment clause of the first
amendment. Id. at 488-89, 448 A.2d at 998. The court concluded
that, notwithstanding the constitutionality of the statutes, fairness
compelled that all eligible students receive credits through the 19821983 academic year, and that those scheduled to graduate in 1984 be
allowed to complete their degrees. Id. at 490, 448 A.2d at 999.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey followed the established rule
of balancing state interests against defendants' first amendment right
to free exercise of religion. If the state's interest is substantial, then
defendants' free exercise of religion may be circumscribed. In this
case, the supreme court recognized that the state's interest in regulating the authority to confer baccalaureate degrees would be significantly impaired by exemptions given to sectarian colleges. The decision of the court makes it clear that minimum educational standards
will be maintained by institutions of higher learning and no exemptions will be tolerated on the basis of free exercise of religion where the
state action does not unduly burden the free exercise of religion.
John M. Simon

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSEDISCRIMINATORY TAXATION OF NONRESIDENT COMMUTERS CONSTITUTES A DENIAL OF LIVELIHOOD WHEN TAX NOT REASONABLY
RELATED TO JUSTIFICATION FOR DISCRIMINATION-Salorio v. Gla-

ser, 93 N.J. 447, 461 A.2d 1100 (1983).
New Jersey, in order to develop, construct, and maintain an
efficient commuter system between itself and New York, adopted a
tax scheme to supplement the cost. The plan, known as the Emergency Transportation Tax (ETT), placed the burden of tax contribution on New York residents choosing to work within New Jersey. The
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nonresident who commuted to the Garden State was subject to both
the ETT and the New Jersey Gross Income Tax, which is assessed
against every individual on earnings derived within the state. 93 N.J.
at 450, 461 A.2d at 1101. State income tax paid by the nonresident
was credited toward the ETT obligation and if there was remaining
ETT liability, the revenue was collected and transferred to a special
transportation fund. Id. at 450-51, 461 A.2d at 1101. Since the ETT
had no effect on the tax liability of New Jersey residents, the additional burden placed on nonresidents was alleged to be discriminatory. The plaintiffs, three New York residents who travelled into New
Jersey for work, brought action against the Director of Taxation for
New Jersey seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against imposition of the ETT. Id. at 449, 461 A.2d at 1101.
The trial court summarily found for the State and the New Jersey
Supreme Court granted immediate certification. Id. The court held in
Salorio v. Glaser, 82 N.J. 482, 461 A.2d 1111, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
874 (1980)(Salorio I), that the tax was not violative of the equal
protection clause. 93 N.J. at 449, 461 A.2d at 1101. The court,
however, also examined the ETT's constitutionality with reference to
the privileges and immunities clause. Id. at 451, 461 A.2d at 1102.
The court noted that a statute is violative of that clause if it unequally
affects nonresidents unless the state can prove that the -nonresidents
were a peculiar source of the evil which the statute is designed to
remedy and that the disparate treatment bore a substantial relationship to this evil.
The Salorio I court acknowledged that the ETT discriminated
against New York residents, but because the record before it was
insufficient to determine either the extent of the problem attributable
to the nonresidents or if there was a substantial relationship between
the ETT and the problem, the case was remanded back to the trial
court. Id. On remand, the trial court held for the State, concluding
that the burden the ETT placed on New York commuters was substantially commensurate with the benefit they derived from New
Jersey's commutation system. Id. at 452, 461 A.2d at 1102-03.
Justice Schreiber, writing for the New Jersey Supreme Court,
reversed, holding that the ETT was violative of the privileges and
immunities clause. Id. at 452, 469, 461 A.2d at 1108, 1112. Justice
Schreiber first observed that the ETT affects the pursuit of livelihood,
a fundamental activity protected by the clause, and he proceeded to
apply the standards enunciated in Salorio I. Id. at 456 , 461 A.2d at
1104. The court initially determined that because of the ETT, the tax
liability of a nonresident was greater than that of a resident with the
same income and that therefore the tax was discriminatory. Id. at
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456-58, 461 A.2d 1104-05. Justice Schreiber then examined the State's
justification for the discriminatory impact. He noted that the state's
excuse for inflicting the tax was the need for facilities to handle the
increased commuter crunch between New Jersey and New York generated by New York residents who worked in New Jersey. Id. at 458,
461 A.2d at 1105-06. Justice Schreiber explained, however, that even
if this justification was valid, the amount charged nonresidents had to
bear a substantial relation to the increased need. Id. at 458-59, 461
A.2d at 1106. After conducting a detailed statistical analysis based on
evidence presented by the state's experts, Justice Schreiber concluded
that the amount of ETT paid by New York residents was far in excess
of their burden on the transportation system. Id. at 459-62, 461 A.2d
at 1106-08. He determined, therefore, that since the ETT failed to
properly correspond to the evil it was supposed to cure, it was invalid.
Id. at 462, 461 A.2d at 1108.
The court, however, rejected plaintiff's argument that damages
should be awarded based on the amount of taxes paid. Id. at 462-66,
461 A.2d at 1108-10. To support this judgment, Justice Schreiber
observed that New Jersey's continued administrative and fiscal stability demanded a prospective application of the decision. Id. at 467, 461
A.2d at 1110. He additionally noted that since plaintiffs received New
York income tax credits for ETT paid, they had suffered no financial
injury, and therefore a prospective application was equitable. Id. at
466, 461 A.2d at 1110. The court resolved that to force New Jersey to
return ETT receipts would be unreasonable, and concluded that all
interests would be best served by enjoining enforcement of the ETT
beginning January 1, 1984. Id. at 467-68, 461 A.2d at 1111.
The decision of the Salorio court was somewhat limited in scope.
The burden that nonresidents placed on the transportation system was
balanced against the exact revenue raised by the ETT. Salorio leaves
open the question of whether a tax commensurate with the evil which
nonresidents place on the commuter system would be valid. The ETT
may not have passed judicial muster even if its tax bite on nonresidents had been less severe. The court, by allowing the state to justify
the disparate treatment of nonresidents, has not made a definitive
statement as to the constitutionality of ETT-type schemes.
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